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ABSTRACT
Over the recent years, it has increasingly been acknowledged that macro prudential policies 
are not only considered to be “a missing ingredient from the current policy framework”, but 
that there has also been “too huge a gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of 
individual financial institutions.”
The link between monetary policy and macro prudential policies, the knowledge of central 
banks in matters relating to information on market conditions and their oversight of payment 
systems, as well as the need to bridge the existing gap between supervisory authorities and 
central  banks whilst  executing their  supervisory roles  and functions,  have necessitated an 
extension of central banks role in the management of liquidity risks and macro prudential 
supervision.
A fundamental aim of this paper is to address how an extension of central banks’ roles in 
macro  prudential  supervision  can  assist  regulators  and  supervisors  in  bridging  the  afore 
mentioned gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of individual  financial 
institutions. In so doing, the need for greater focus on macro prudential factors, namely, the 
system as a whole, as opposed to mere focus on the supervision of individual institutions will 
be highlighted. The expertise and knowledge with which a central bank is endowed in its role 
as overseer of the entire payments system – as well as the quality of information which it has 
access to, are some of those factors which add weight to its ability to bridge “the gap”.
Key Words: macro prudential, Financial Crisis, central banks, Basel III, systemic risk, 
supervision, liquidity, information; Banking Reform Act; Financial Services Act; regulators
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691278
Table of Contents
A. Introduction
The Increased Impact of Macro Prudential Supervision
B. An Extension of the Traditional Roles of Central Banks
Traditional Roles of Central Banks
The Role of Central Banks in Managing Liquidity Risks 
C. Macro Prudential Supervision and Basel III
Progress made with Counter Cyclical Measures in Various Jurisdictions
Dynamic Provisioning
Why Central Banks Assume Such a Crucial Role Given the Present Framework of Basel III
D. Re delineating Duties and Roles of Central Banks and Supervisory Agencies in 
Matters relating to Regulation and Supervision
E. Need For Central Bank Independence From Political Interference
ii. Need for Adequate Balance Between Rules and Discretion in Designing an Effective 
Macro prudential Regime.
Conclusion
REFERENCES
Redefining a Role for Central Banks: The Increased Importance of Central 
Banks’ Roles in the Management of Liquidity Risks and Macro prudential 
Supervision in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
The Increased Impact of Macro Prudential Supervision
Prudential supervision which is carried out at macro level is distinguished from that which is 
carried out at  micro level in the sense that micro prudential  supervision restricts  itself  to 
individual firms whilst macro prudential supervision operates on a system wide basis. Pro 
cyclical effects which have been generated through Basel II internal credit risk models (which 
relate  to  the  fact  banks’  internal  credit  risk  models  were  overly  sensitive  in  their 
implementation2 for the calculation of regulatory capital) – along with the need to address 
systemic risks in a more efficient manner, are amongst some of the reasons attributed to why 
greater emphasis on prudential supervision at macro level is of vital importance.
The concept “macro prudential”  can be defined as “policy which focuses on the financial 
system as a whole, and also treats aggregate risk as endogenous with regard to the collective 
behaviour of institutions.”3
One principal aspect of macro prudential supervision and regulation, as reflected by Basel III, 
is the fact that it provides for a consideration of the build up of systemic risks over time – 
particularly pro cyclical effects generated within the financial sector.
Over the recent years, it has increasingly been acknowledged that macro prudential policies 
are not only considered to be “a missing ingredient from the current policy framework”, but 
that there has also been “too huge a gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of 
individual financial institutions.”4
1Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen and Oxford Brookes University, Oxford. 
Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2 In their implementation to facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine 
the level of capital which large banks must retain.”
3 E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at the 
6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled „Causes 
and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 2 
http://www.ephilipdavis.com/macroprudential_regulation[1].pdf
4 Please also refer to abstract;  See Bank of England, Executive Summary “Role of Macro Prudential Policy” 
Discussion Paper November 2009  at page 3 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdf
B. An Extension of the Traditional Roles of Central Banks
Traditional Roles of Central Banks
1) Lender of Last Resort Arrangements
The  need  for  the  creation  of  bridge  banks  and a  Special  Resolution  Regime  (SRR)  was 
brought to light following numerous related proposals which were put forward following the 
financial woes of banks such as Northern Rock and Hypo Real Estate.5
One of the weaknesses of central banks which was revealed during the Financial Crisis was 
the inability of the Bank of England to perform its traditional role as lender of last resort for a 
limited period of time (without such a role being made public) – which created problems that 
triggered the run on Northern Rock.
Unconventional measures which were introduced by advanced economies in response to the 
latter stages of 2008 include liquidity provision to banks on extra ordinary terms – particularly 
for longer periods of maturity and intervention in selected credit markets.6
2)Oversight of payment systems
Furthermore, as observed by Hannoun7, central banks are increasingly being put in charge of 
overseeing systemic risk. Such an innovative role can be considered to be an extension of 
their  traditional  role  as  overseers  of  payment  systems.  Hannoun goes  on  to  attribute  the 
delegation of such responsibility for the oversight of systemic risk as owing to their unique 
positions as ultimate providers of liquidity – which places them in a such a formidable stance 
to focus on system wide risks (as well as obtaining an integrated view of both the individual 
financial institutions and the financial system as a whole).8
In addition to their unique position as ultimate providers of liquidity, the extensive knowledge 
possessed by central banks – such knowledge and expertise being attributed to their role as 
overseers of payment systems, their means of acquiring such knowledge and expertise, places 
them in a formidable position in matters relating to the responsibility for macro prudential 
supervision.
Two examples  have been put  forward to  bolster  the argument  that  “the macro prudential 
approach to  supervision  should take into  consideration  the  fact  that,  even when financial 
institutions appear to be strong on an individual basis, systemic risk could still emerge as a 
result of the interconnectedness of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures” - such 
examples being the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the proposed 
Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States.9 
5 For further information on bridge banks and means whereby ailing banks could efficiently be relieved of their 
assets, see D Schäfer and KF Zimmerman, “Bad Bank (s) and Re capitalization of the Banking Sector” (2009) 
Discussion Paper 897 of DIW Berlin <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3656>
6 “Such a measure being aimed at supporting secondary market liquidity and the outright purchase of bonds”. 
See H Hannoun, “The Expanding Role of Central Banks Since the Crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank 
for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 3
7 see ibid
8 ibid
9 ibid
The Role of Central Banks in Managing Liquidity10 Risks 
As well as highlighting the need to address the question on how much maturity transformation 
is needed – in matters relating to maturity transformation and liquidity risks, it is argued that 
“maturity  transformation  is  one  of  those  areas  which  we  rely  on  the  banking  system  to 
perform  and  that  since  there  may  never  be  enough  short-term  liabilities  issued  by 
governments  and  the  private  sector  (to  satisfy  the  demand  for  liquid  short-term  savings 
instruments),  that  the primary function of banks in providing these vehicles to the public, 
should be welcomed.”11
The likelihood that banks are exposed to significant levels of liquidity risks arises from the 
nature  of  commercial  banks’  business,  namely,  the  fact  that  such business  involves,  to  a 
fundamental extent, maturity transformation.
The provision of central bank reserves account serves as a means whereby commercial banks 
are able to manage their liquidity risk – through a process which enables them to meet their 
“ordinary payment needs – including normal intra day variations.”12
C. Macro Prudential Supervision and Basel III
Under  its  macro  prudential  overlay  and  its  efforts  to  address  stability  over  time  (pro 
cyclicality),  one  of  those  initiatives  highlighted  under  the  Basel  III  framework  includes 
counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning.
Progress made with Counter Cyclical Measures in Various Jurisdictions
According to Brunnermeier et al, counter cyclical measures should be applied on a country 
specific basis since cycles are not identical across several jurisdictions around the world.13 In 
their opinion, it is yet  too early to talk about a “global cycle” since “credit expansion has 
taken place at a very different pace in various countries.”14 As observed by Caprio Jr, even 
though15 no country thus far had adopted a counter cyclical  capital  requirement policy,  as 
recommended by Brunnermeier  et  al,  a few have adopted counter  cyclical  provisioning – 
10 “Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses.” See Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervision” < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
11 See S Cecchetti, „Financial Reform: A Progress Report“ Remarks prepared for the Westminster Economic 
Forum, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, October 2010 at page 4 of 6 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101004.htm
12 Maturity  transformation  is  evident  within  the  banking  system  and  day  to  day  business  operations  since 
“customer deposits may be available for instant withdrawals while bank lending to corporations and households 
tends to be committed, potentially for many years.” See P Fisher,  „Managing Liquidity in the System – the 
Bank’s Liquidity Insurance Operations“ at page 2 <http://www.bis.org/review/r101004e.pdf>
13 See M Brunnermeier et al, “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation” Geneva Reports on the 
World Economy, 11< http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf> at page 37 (page 55 of 
98)
14 In this respect, they illustrate with the example that Germany and Italy did not share in the housing cycle that 
affected the USA, UK, Spain etc. See ibid
15 As of February 2010
Spain being the first  to implement  such,  followed by Colombia and much more  recently, 
Peru.16
Measures aimed at “building up reserves over the cycle which might be part of regulatory 
capital or separate from it and which would amount to 2 – 3 % of risk weighted assets at the 
peak  of  a  boom”  have  been  proposed  in  the  UK by  its  financial  services  regulator,  the 
Financial Services Authority.17 Other measures of counter cyclical regulation which are being 
considered  by  other  jurisdictions  (and  which  would  “limit  the  scope  under  Basel  2 
arrangements for banks to assess their own risk by providing a one-size fits all ceiling and 
may be beneficial in making regulation more transparent)18 could include “an overall leverage 
ratio of capital to unadjusted assets (rather than risk weighted assets).”19
Dynamic Provisioning
Whilst  the  principles  of  the  Spanish  Dynamic  Provision  Mechanism  are  lauded  by 
Brunnermeier et al, its “quantitative effect” is not considered by them to have had a moderate 
effect on the credit  cycle – to the same extent as their proposed mechanism. Its universal 
adoption20, is however, considered to represent a “ counter- cyclical- lite” in the case where 
their proposal (Brunnermeier et al’s proposal) is considered as being too radical.
Why Central Banks Assume Such a Crucial Role Given the Present Framework of Basel III
In its present form, Basel III accords much pre eminence to the need for macro prudential 
supervision – as well as a macro prudential framework.
Central banks, it is argued, have a key role to play in establishing such a macro prudential 
framework – as well as a role in macro prudential supervision and regulation for the following 
reasons:21
- Developing and structuring macro prudential measures requires reliable analytical and 
forecasting skills – for instance, with regard to the overall economy or specific market 
segments. Central banks have extensive and soundly based knowledge of these fields.
16 See G Caprio Jr, “Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Counter cyclical Regulatory Requirements” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5198, The World Bank Development Research Group, Finance and 
Private Sector Development Team, February 2010 at page 11
17 See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at 
the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled 
„Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 10 and also 
Financial Services Authority, “The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global banking Crisis” FSA 
Publications 2009
18 Although it is added that “it is essential that such ceiling applies to all relevant assets and does not encourage 
banks to use off-balance structures to evade such a ceiling” See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential 
Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy 
Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled „Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial 
Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 10
19 ibid
20 „Including the adjustment of IFRS to allow that to occur”
21 TJ Jordan, „A Changing Role for Central Banks ?“ Speech by Mr Thomas J Jordan, Vice Chairman of the 
Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Welcome Event Master of Banking and Finance, St. Gallen, 
22 September 2010, page 4
http://www.bis.org/review/r100924b.pdf
- Macro prudential policy interacts closely with monetary policy – which implies that 
information  advantage  of  central  banks  could  be  important  in  shaping  macro 
prudential measures
We  may  then  infer  that  central  banks'  crucial  roles  in  establishing  a  macro  prudential 
framework provide  the  key  to  bridging  the  gap  between macro  economic  policy and the 
regulation of individual financial institutions. This however, on its own, is insufficient – close 
collaboration  and  effective  information  sharing  between  central  banks  and  regulatory 
authorities is paramount. Principle 17 of the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management 
and Supervision22 consolidates on this argument.
Principle  17  of  the  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision23 
elaborates on how cooperation and information sharing between relevant public authorities 
(including  bank  supervisors,  central  banks  and  securities  regulators)  can  contribute 
significantly to the effectiveness of the roles assumed by these authorities.
Such communication will not only facilitate a process where:24
- supervisors are able to improve their assessments of the overall profile of a bank and 
the risks it faces (and help other authorities assess the risks presented to the broader 
financial system); but also
- Assist supervisors in informing central banks of their judgement regarding the range 
of liquidity risks faced by firms (for which they are responsible) while central banks 
may  help  supervisors  deepen  their  understanding  of  the  current  financial  market 
environment and risks to the financial system as a whole
Central banks’ knowledge of information on market conditions could also be beneficial for 
supervisors in  their  assessment  of  the “appropriateness  of assumptions  made by banks in 
stress test scenarios and contingency funding plans.”25 Furthermore, in their role as overseers 
of  the  payment  and  settlement  system,  central  banks  are  able  to  assist  supervisors  in 
“deepening  their  understanding  of  the  linkages  between  institutions  and  the  potential  for 
disruptions to spread across the financial system.”26
In  addition  to  the  general  practice  undertaken  by  central  banks  -  which  involves  the 
implementation of frequent “Financial Stability Reviews” which are aimed at evaluating the 
outlook for financial stability, “the initial policy objectives” of macro prudential regulation, 
according to Davis and Karim include the early identification of potential vulnerabilities and 
the  encouragement  of  such  financial  institutions  to  undertake  stress  testing  (this  being 
facilitated through the public reporting which is carried out by financial institutions).27
22 See Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision” paragraph 144, at page 34 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
23 ibid
24 see ibid at page 35
25 ibid
26 ibid
27 See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote address at 
the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled 
“Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What Lessons for EU Countries?” see particularly 
pages 10 and 11 
http://www.euroframe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/euroframe/docs/2009/EUROF09_macroprudential_regulation.
pdf
The previous section focussed on the importance of information sharing and communication 
between  central  banks  and  regulatory  agencies.  Desirable  qualities  of  such  information 
exchanges  and communicative  links  include timeliness,  accuracy and completeness  of the 
information being communicated. As well as information sharing and communication, other 
aspects  which  cannot  be  addressed  comprehensively  here  relate  to  moral  hazard28 and 
information asymmetry29 and particularly, the need to address consequences of excessive risk 
taking incentives.
D. Re delineating Duties and Roles of Central Banks and Supervisory Agencies in 
Matters relating to Regulation and Supervision
As was highlighted in a previous paper,30 even though the aftermath of the recent Financial 
Crises is likely to witness the era of more prominent roles being transferred to central banks 
across  several  jurisdictions,  a  fundamental  change  and  re-definition  in  roles  and 
responsibilities  between  national  supervisors  and central  banks  is  expected  in  the  United 
Kingdom – as compared to jurisdictions such as Germany and the United States.31
The Banking Reform Act in the UK, not only provides the Bank of England with “ a legal 
objective to contribute to protecting and enhancing the stability of the financial systems of the 
UK but also formalises the Bank of England’s role in the supervision of payment systems.”32 
The  ability  of  the  Bank  to  request  data  from banks  through  the  regulator,  the  FSA,  as 
compared to the present situation where the FSA is only able to collect data it requires itself, 
is considered to be “an important innovation”33 under the Act. These arrangements under the 
Act  are also considered to be an important  and vital  means  whereby the Bank is  able  to 
acquire “more detailed understanding of developments about the banking system.”34
„On 19 November 2009 the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced the Financial Services 
Bill  into  Parliament.  The  Bill,  which  reforms  financial  services  regulation  and  contains 
provisions to improve redress for consumers, and financial education and awareness, received 
Royal Assent on 8 April 2010. The Act includes:35
28 For further information on the need to address moral hazard,  exit strategies – as well as the provision by 
governments  of  incentives  to  financial  institutions  (as  a  means  of  preventing  them  from  depending  on 
government support once the economy begins to recover), see J Rodriguez-Miguez and M Ojo, “Juridical and 
Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of 
Financial Crisis” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646320>
29For further information on information asymmetry and the role of governments and central banks in regulation, 
see M Ojo, The Need for Government and Central Bank Intervention in Financial Regulation: Free Banking and 
the Challenges of Information Uncertainty http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624918
30 See J Rodriguez - Miguez and M Ojo, “Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation 
and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of Financial Crisis” 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646320>
31 ibid
32 E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote address at the 6th 
Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled “Causes and 
Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What Lessons for EU Countries?” at page 12 
http://www.qass.org.uk/2009-July_Brunel-conference/Davis.pdf
33 See ibid
34 ibid
35HM Treasury, „Financial Services Act“ http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_bill_index.htm
− A new statutory financial stability objective for the Financial Services Authority (FSA);
− A new independent consumer financial education body, established by the FSA; 
− Provision for regulations on remuneration transparency, and a duty for the FSA to make rules on 
remuneration;
− A duty for the FSA to make rules requiring firms to produce recovery and resolution plans (also known 
as “living wills”); 
− Power for the FSA to ban short selling of certain instruments, and establish a permanent disclosure 
regime; and 
Greater disciplinary powers for the FSA, including earlier disclosure of investigations.“
The new statutory duty conferred on the UK’s financial services regulator (the FSA), namely, 
the new financial stability objective, is aimed at reinforcing the FSA’s international focus.36 
Such an aim required not only “a consideration of the importance of re affirming the roles of 
the Treasury, Bank of England and the FSA, but also the need to establish mechanisms which 
would help ensure that the tripartite authorities speak with a common voice in international 
fora.”37 Of  paramount  importance  is  the  expectation  that  such  a  statutory  duty  would 
complement the Government and the Bank of England’s responsibility.38
Hence whilst, greater powers have been transferred to the Bank of England39, the FSA has 
also acquired a new statutory duty – in addition to the previous four statutory objectives.
E. Need For Central Bank Independence From Political Interference
One vital reason attributed to the need for Government intervention to correct market failure, 
it is argued, arises from the fact that “market participants cannot manage systemic risks if left 
to  their  own  devices.”40 This  also  constitutes  a  need  for  macro  prudential  supervision. 
However, the question relating to the level of macro prudential oversight to be delegated to 
central banks and the degree of Government intervention also needs to be addressed. Whilst 
the flaws inherent within the tripartite authorities in the UK (the Treasury, Bank and FSA) 
during Northern Rock crisis include the failure to promptly detect and adequately monitor 
risks to system  as a whole , and such a flaw could be addressed given the central bank’s 
ability  (via  its  intervention)  to provide  invaluable  source of  liquidity  funding in  terms  of 
timeliness, collaboration between the Government and the central bank should not be so close 
that such proximity would influence central bank’s monetary setting policies. The level of 
independence required between central banks and their governments (to facilitate effective 
working relationships) would depend on institutional settings – as well as country specific 
circumstances. 
36 See HM Treasury, Reforming Financial Markets July 2009 at page 99
37 „“Whilst continuing to give adequate attention to regulatory debates” ibid
38 ibid
39 As well as responsibility for systemic oversight, the grant of further supplementary oversight functions to the 
Bank of England, it is further argued, will be desirable. For further information on this, see Shearman and 
Sterling LLP, “UK Government Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform” June 2010 and Treasury Select 
Committee, “Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision_ Macro prudential Supervision” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/76707.htm
40 See Statement of Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Treasury Select Committee, 
“Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision_ Macro prudential Supervision” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/76707.htm
ii. Need for Adequate Balance Between Rules and Discretion in Designing an Effective 
Macro prudential Regime.
Be it a rules- based scheme which stipulates that banks should build up buffers of general 
provisions,41 capital  conservation  rules  for  stronger  capital  buffers,  or  a  principles  based 
regime (in which a considerable degree of judgment and discretion will be exercised), “any 
macroprudential policy framework should seek to be credible, with policy decisions applied 
consistently and systemically.  To be consistent over time,  a regime needs to be robust to 
uncertainty and unforeseen events.”42
Conclusion
The aftermath  of  the  recent  Financial  Crisis  has  witnessed an  extension  in  the  roles  and 
responsibilities  of  central  banks  across  several  jurisdictions.  Such an  extension  embraces 
increased responsibilities for the oversight of systemic risks - as well as the formalisation of 
responsibilities for the oversight of payment systems. An extension of the central bank's role 
in macroprudential supervision is not only required because of the expertise and knowledge 
possessed  by  central  banks  in  areas  relating  to  the  development  and  structuring  of 
macroprudential  measures  (which  requires  reliable  and  analytical  forecasting  skills),  or 
because  the  information  advantage  of  central  banks  could  be  important  in  shaping 
macroprudential meaures, but because close and effective collaboration between supervisors 
and central banks, particularly pursuant to Principle 17 of the Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk  Management  and  Supervision,  could  help  bridge  the  gap  between  macro  economic 
policy and the regulation of individual financial institutions.
41Such as that of the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Model; such a model „requires banks to build up buffers of 
general provisions against performing loans during periods of upturns – which could then be drawn from during 
recessive turns“ see Bank of England, „Role of Macroprudential Policy“ 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudential091121.pdf> 
Discussion Paper November 2009 at page 8
42See ibid at page 27
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